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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF CONGRESSIONAL
COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
634 F.2d 19 (1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (June 22, 1981)
In 1976, in the case of National League of Cities v. Usery,I the
United States Supreme Court found a congressional regulation of in-
terstate commerce to be an unconstitutional impairment of the sover-
eignty of state and local governments.2 The Court held that a 1974
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act3 which extended federal
minimum wage and maximum hour regulations to state employees dis-
placed the states' freedom to structure "integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions."' 4 With its decision the Court over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz5 which had upheld application of the FLSA to
employees of state-owned schools and hospitals. 6 Although the Court
contended that the National League of Cities decision rested on an es-
tablished concept of tenth amendment limitation 7 on Congress' regula-
tory power under the commerce clause," the decision was a major shift
from previous holdings.9
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. Id at 852.
3. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as FLSAJ originally excluded state employees
from coverage. Coverage was extended in 1974. The term "employer" was broadened to include
"public agency" which was in turn expanded to include "the government of a state or political
subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. IV 1974).
4. 426 U.S. at 852.
5. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
6. Id at 198.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." The Court in National League of Cites stated: "This Court has never doubted that there
are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the
Constitution." 426 U.S. at 842.
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides in relevant part: "The Congress shall have Power
... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."
9. It had been 40 years since the Court applied constitutionally based limitations on Con-
gress' regulatory power under the commerce clause. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936). Commentators had noted a clue to this shift in a footnote to Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal controls over wage increases
to state employees under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Title II of the Act of August 15,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799. The prophetic footnote pointed out that the petitioner's
argument, based on a tenth amendment limitation of Congress' commerce power, was not without
significance as that amendment declares that "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that
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National League of Cities has been criticized as the ambiguous ex-
pression of a divided court' 0 which does not provide workable guide-
lines for lower courts. I In addition, the decision raised the question of
the constitutionality of other federal regulations applying to state and
local government employees. 12
In a recent decision, United Transportation Union v. Long Island
Jail Road,'3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
relied on National League of Cities to find the operation of a state-
owned railroad to be an integral governmental function free from fed-
eral commerce clause regulation. Employees of the Long Island Rail
Road (LIRR) were granted the right to strike under the Railway Labor
Act,14 which was enacted in 1926 and which, unlike later federal labor
regulations, applied to public as well as private employees. New York
State, their employer, on the other hand, prohibited public employee
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 421 U.S. at
547 n.7. See, e.g., Strong, Court v. Constitution- Disparate Distortions of the Indirect Limitations in
the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C.L. REV. 125, 132-37 (1976); The Supreme Court,
1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 46, 48-50 (1975).
10. Justice Rehnquist authored the plurality opinion joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
Powell, and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall. Justice Stevens wrote a separate
dissenting opinion. 426 U.S. at 834.
11. See Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The New Federalism andAffirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1977); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce
Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115 (1978) [hereinafter referred to
as Schwartz].
12. See, e.g., Currie, OSHIA, 1976 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1107, 1109 (Congress
is banned from extending mandatory Occupational Health and Safety Act coverage to state and
local governmental employees); Note, The Constitutionality ofthe ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L.
REV. 363 (1976) (discussing the constitutionality of the Federal Age Discrimination Act as applied
to state employment practices).
13. 634 F.2d 19 (1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (June 22, 1981).
14. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
RLA]. The purpose of the RLA is:
(I) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or
any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join
a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of
employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter,
(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of
all disputes rowing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agree-
ments covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151(a).
The Supreme Court upheld the RLA in the landmark decision of Texas & New Orleans R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), thereby recognizing Congress' authority
to regulate labor relations in interstate commerce. Although not explicitly stated in the RLA, the
parties may resort to self-help once the RLA's procedures have been exhausted. See also Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
strikes under the Taylor Law. 15 When contract negotiations between
the employees' unions and the state were on the verge of collapse, the
unions filed suit in the Eastern District of New York seeking (1) a de-
claratory judgment that the relationship between the parties was gov-
erned by the RLA and (2) an injunction against state prosecution under
the Taylor Law. The district judge found the LIRR to be a "carrier"
engaged in interstate commerce and therefore subject to the RLA. He
concluded that the federal scheme preempted the state regulation.'
6
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed on the basis of National League
of Cities. 17
The decision in National League of Cities was a substantial depar-
ture from the pattern of Supreme Court holdings on this issue during
the previous forty-year period. Not since 1937 had the Court found a
tenth amendment limitation of congressional commerce clause regula-
tion. The Second Circuit decision in Long Island Rail Road broadened
the reach of National League of Cities to prohibit employee activities
previously sanctioned by well-established national labor law.18
This comment will examine Long Island Rail Road as it extends
the National League of Cities standard for limiting congressional regu-
lation in the area of labor law. It will be shown that Long Island Rail
Road epitomizes the extent of misinterpretation that can occur when a
lower court attempts to follow the indistinct guidelines of National
League of Cities. Since the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari' 9 for Long Island Rail Road, suggestions will be made con-
cerning clarification of the National League of Cities standard.
In order to appreciate the curtailing effect of National League of
Cities, it is necessary to trace the development of congressional com-
merce clause power. Case law illustrates the far-reaching ability of
Congress to regulate commerce and labor law. In addition, it will be
15. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (McKinney) provides that "[nio public employee or em-
ployee organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or employee organization
shall cause, instigate, encourage or condone a strike."
16. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
17. 634 F.2d at 20.
18. Under the authority of U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, which gives Congress power to
enact any laws necessary and proper for implementing the other powers granted to the federal
government by the Constitution, Congress enacted comprehensive national labor law to regulate
collective bargaining. National labor law is embodied in the following five acts: Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976);
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter referred to
as NLRA]; Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 2, 73
Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)).
19. 101 S. Ct. 3107 (June 22, 1981).
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shown that the type of tenth amendment limitation announced in Na-
tional League of Cities and later brandished by the Second Circuit in
Long Island Rail Road was earlier rejected by the Supreme Court.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Commerce Clause Power
The commerce clause of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce. 20 Although Congress did not
exercise its power to regulate for one hundred years after the Constitu-
tion was drafted, 2' the Supreme Court planted the seed of modem day
commerce clause power in McCulloch v. Maryland22 in which congres-
sional exercise of power not specifically enumerated in the Constitution
was questioned. In McCulloch, the Court found that the federal gov-
ernment had implied authority, by virtue of the necessary and proper
clause, 23 to do what is necessary to achieve the purpose of an enumer-
ated power.
24
In the 1824 decision of Gibbons v. Ogden,25 the Supreme Court
defined interstate commerce as "that commerce which concerns more
states than one."' 26 Interpretation of that phrase from Gibbons v. Ogden
prompted the Court in early cases to decide that Congress could regu-
late activities that were interstate, and states could regulate activities
that were intrastate. 27 Thus, categories of private local conduct which
were exclusively regulated by state authority were considered to be
outside the reach of congressional power.
28
An alternate theory to the local versus interstate approach began
developing with congressional attempts to regulate the fast growing,
monopolistic railroad industry.29 In Houston E. & W Texas Railway v.
20. See note 8 .supra.
21. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890 were the first mani-
festations of commerce clause power.
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 353.
25. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
26. Id at 194.
27. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Leloup
v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Railroad Co. v. Husen,
95 U.S. 465 (1877).
28. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (mining); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (agriculture); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
(manufacturing).
29. For an unromanticized commentary on the growth of the rail industry, see D. BRowN,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
United States30 (the Shreveport Rate Case), the Court upheld the au-
thority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate intrastate
rail. rates because of their "close and substantial relation to interstate
traffic. . . . "3 Congressional regulation of local matters pertaining to
railroad safety was upheld,32 as was prescription of maximum working
hours for intrastate railroad workers connected with movement of in-
terstate trains.3
3
In addition to railroad regulations, federal laws enacted to protect
public health and to preserve morality were upheld.34 These laws were
concerned with prohibiting interstate transportation of persons or prod-
ucts and were successful up to the point that they interfered with eco-
nomic considerations. For example, Hammer v. Dagenhart35
invalidated the Child Labor Act of 1916, which prohibited interstate
transportation of child-made goods on the ground that production of
goods intended for interstate commerce was a local matter. Thus, the
local versus interstate distinction persisted. During the Depression, ad-
herence to the theory that local activity was too indirectly related to
interstate commerce to necessitate federal regulation resulted in the in-
validation of numerous laws designed to deal with serious national
problems.3 6
HEAR THAT LONESOME WHISTLE BLOW (1977). The first transcontinental railroad was completed
in 1869. Id at 132. By 1893 five transcontinentals were in business: the Union Pacific-Central
Pacific, Northern Pacific, Southern Pacific, Santa Fe, and Great Northern. Id at 268. Brown
aptly described the railroad monopoly:
Thousands and thousands of settlers who had regarded the Iron Horse with awe and
gratitude for bringing them to their homes in the West soon realized that they were now
totally dependent upon a railroad for their existence. They no longer controlled their
own fortunes; they were helpless before the power of a corrupt monopoly capable of
using bribery, force, any means to maintain its dominion .... The cost of shipping
grain from the Dakotas to Chicago, for instance, was greater than the cost of shipping
the same grain from Chicago to Liverpool.
Id at 272-73.
30. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
31. Id at 351. Accord, Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563
(1922). See also Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924) (power to control
intrastate rail earnings).
32. Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
33. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
34. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918) (Pure Food and Drug Act); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (White Slave Act); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)
(Lottery Act).
35. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
36. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 could not
constitutionally regulate maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines); Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 could not
reach wages and hours of intrastate poultry workers); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidated Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 which required compulsory retire-
ment and pension for carriers subject to Interstate Commerce Act). See generally Stern, The Com-
merce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946).
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The trend changed in 1937 when the Supreme Court decided Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 
37 In up-
holding the National Labor Relations Act,38 the Court declared "[tlhe
close and intimate effect which brings the subject within the reach of
federal power may be due to activities in relation to productive indus-
try although the industry when separately viewed is local."' 39 Jones &
Laughlin gave new life to the rationale that national regulation could
reach intrastate activities based on their practical effect on interstate
commerce. ° In United States v. Darby4 1 the Court found that goods
produced intrastate by substandard labor conditions had a practical ef-
fect on interstate commerce.42 Darby upheld the FLSA which prohib-
ited both the interstate shipment of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions and payment of insufficient wages and overtime in
production of goods for commerce.4 3 The Court stated that Congress
had the power to exclude substandard goods from interstate commerce
and could "choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of
the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate
activities." 44
The rationale that purely local activities could be congressionally
regulated because they "affect" interstate commerce was developed fur-
ther in Wickard v. Filburn.45 In Wickard the Court upheld the author-
ity of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193846 to regulate wheat
produced solely for home consumption and laid to rest the idea that
certain activities were beyond commerce clause reach because of their
local character or indirect effect on interstate commerce. 4
7
With Wikard, the seed that had been planted in McCulloch v. Ma-
37. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). The substantive provisions of the Act were modeled on the
RLA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (collective bargaining between freely chosen representatives of
employers and employees tends to eliminate strikes and the obstructions to interstate commerce
they cause).
39. 301 U.S. at 38.
40. Id at 41-42. "We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical concep-
tion. It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment
that does not ignore actual experience." Id
41. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
42. Id at 122.
43. Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
44. 312 U.S. at 121.
45. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
46. Ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
47. 317 U.S. at 119-25. For commentary illuminating rejection of the idea that certain cate-
gories of private local activities should be exclusively regulated by the states, see Ely, The Irrepres-
sible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 701 (1974).
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ryland48 reached full bloom. To determine the validity of federal regu-
lation after Wickard, the Court merely looked for a rational connection
between the challenged regulation and the constitutional grant of
power in the commerce clause. If such a rational connection was
found, the federal regulation prevailed, provided it was not limited by
some other constitutional power.4 9 In particular, this approach had
far-reaching effects in upholding federal authority to regulate labor
relations.
Development of National Labor Law
The federal interest motivating enactment of national labor regu-
lation was to strike a balance of power in labor-management rela-
tions.50 Congress determined that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to avoid the conflicts
likely to result from a variety of local procedures. 5' By basing validity
of federal regulation on the rational connection between the regulation
and commerce clause power, the new approach extended federal au-
thority to local activities which affected interstate commerce even
though the local activities themselves were neither interstate nor com-
mercial.5 2 With this extension, regulation of private conduct concerned
with labor relations became the exclusive jurisdiction of federal author-
ity. For example, in 1945, the Court decided in Hill v. Florida ex rel
48. In McCulioch the Court stated: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end...
are constitutional." 17 U.S. at 421.
49. The analysis used in applying the standard was outlined in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1956), in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion:
For analytical purposes, I think it useful to break down the issue before us into two
questions: First, is there a rational connection between the [challenged statute] . . . and
[a] power of Congress [enumerated in the Constitution] . . . ; in other words, is there
any initial power here at all? Second, if there is such a rational connection, to what
extent does [the] statute, though reasonably calculated to subserve an enumerated power
; in other words, can this statute, however appropriate to the Article I power looked
at in isolation, survive against [limitations expressed m the Constitution]. . . ? I recog-
nize that these two questions are ultimately one and the same, since the scope of the
Article I power is not separable from the limitations imposed by [the Constitution] ....
Nevertheless, I think it will make for clarity of analysis to consider them separately.
Id at 70.
50. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1339 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as Cox].
51. See Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
52. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), where it is stated that
"[a]lthough activites may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to
exercise that control."
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Watson 53 that conduct protected by federal statute could not be made
illegal by local law. In Hill, the Court held that state legislation which
interfered with the right of employees to bargain collectively was in-
consistent with guarantees of federal labor law and therefore
unconstitutional.5
4
In addition to preempting state authority over protected activity as
in Hill, the Court found that federal law preempts state authority when
the activity is prohibited by federal law. In Garner v. Teamsters Local
776, 5 the Court held that the state could not enjoin picketing, even
though the type of picketing in question was forbidden by both federal
labor law and Pennsylvania law.5 6 Under this decision, states may not
apply local law, whether statutory or common law in origin, which
duplicates the federal statute.
The broad reach of federal authority in labor relations displaced
state authority with few exceptions. States retained power to prevent
violent conduct in labor disputes, 57 and jurisdiction over certain tort
5 8
and contract 59 actions was left to the states. In all other areas, activities
affecting interstate commerce were exclusively regulated by federal
statute.60 However, National League of Cities gave new life to the old
concept favoring state regulation of certain activities affecting interstate
commerce. An examination of case law will indicate that National
League of Cities adopted a constitutionally based limitation on con-
53. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
54. Id at 542. In the area of collective bargaining in particular, decisions forbid state regula-
tion of strikes, picketing, and similar activity protected by federal law. See, e.g., Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1970) (state preempted from adjudicat-
ing intraunion dispute); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1950) (Michigan
strike control law invalidated).
55. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
56. Id at 498-501.
57. Where violence is likely to occur, the state may use its police power to ensure public
safety. See, e.g., UAW v. Russel, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (union maliciously interfered with lawful
occupation of employee); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (picketing accompa-
nied by insults and abusive behavior likely to cause violence); United Constr. Workers v. Labur-
num Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (contractor threatened and intimidated by union
representative).
58. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (union member re-
covered from union officials for intentional infliction of mental distress); Linn v. United Plant
Workers, 383 U.S, 53 (1966) (malicious libel).
59. See, e.g., William Arnold Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974) (recovery
for breach of contract on violation of "no strike" clause).
60. In addition to preempting state authority over conduct that is expressly protected, as in
Hill, or prohibited, as in Garner, the Court has determined that conduct which is "arguably"
protected or prohibited is also beyond state jurisdiction. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For commentary on the preemption doctrine, see Cox, supra note
50.
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gressional regulatory power that had been repeatedly rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in prior cases.
Rejection of the Tenth Amendment Limitation
of Commerce Clause Power
Although it is clear that Congress has authority to regulate inter-
state commerce, there have been numerous challenges to that authority
when federal regulations are applied to activities carried on by state
and local governments. 61 Prior to National League of Cities, states at-
tempted to remove themselves from federal regulation by arguing that
certain of their activities were distinguishable from the sort Congress
was empowered to regulate.62 A theoretical base for such arguments
was the tenth amendment's reservation of power to the states, 63 but as
early as 1819, the Court decided that the tenth amendment could not be
used to weaken Congress' enumerated powers.64 Thus, the threshold
question addressed by the Court was whether Congress had any power
to enact the particular regulation. If the regulation was a direct exer-
cise of an enumerated power, or if the regulation had a legitimate pur-
pose rationally related to an enumerated power, the regulation was
held applicable to state activities.
For example, a leading case denying a state's exclusion from fed-
eral regulation was United States v. Calfornia.65 At issue in that case
was whether the Safety Appliance Act66 applied to a state-owned and
operated railroad. The state claimed that it should escape the reach of
the Act because in operating the railroad it was "performing a public
61. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding application of the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970 to salaries of state and local employees); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding application of Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees of hospi-
tals and schools); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (state as railroad owner subject to
grievance procedures of RLA); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (upholding appli-
cation of Federal Safety Appliance Act to a state-owned and operated railroad); Sanitary Dist. of
Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (upholding federal restriction of a local sanitary
district from withdrawing water from river despite district's claims of health hazards).
62. Concepts relying on a distinction of activities as a basis for defining a constitutional limi-
tation on federal regulatory power have been rejected by the Court. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968) (sovereign state functions); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 654
(1961) (historically local activities); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946) (essential government
function); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936) (distinction between governmental
and proprietary state functions).
63. For text of U.S. CONST. amend. X see note 7 supra.
64. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (the tenth amendment does
not exclude from the Constitution any incidental or implied powers of the federal government;
rather, these powers "depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument").
65. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
66. 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6 (1976).
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function in its sovereign capacity." 67 The Court rejected the claim,
stating that it was irrelevant that the activity was carried on in the
state's sovereign capacity.68 The Court observed that the state's claim
was no different from the sort of argument a private citizen might
make.69 Neither claim provided limitation of federal commerce clause
power.
The principle of United States v. California was used by the Court
in Maryland v. Wirtz 70 to uphold application of the minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions of the FLSA to employees of state-owned
schools and hospitals.7 ' The state claimed it should not be subject to
the Act on the theory that the statute interfered with peformance of a
state "governmental function. ' 72 After establishing that Congress had
authority to regulate the minimum labor standards of schools and hos-
pitals,73 the Court determined that the extent of intrusion on the state's
functioning was irrelevant to evaluating the statute's validity.74 Be-
cause the Court located a rational basis for regarding the FLSA as reg-
ulation of interstate commerce among the states, the Court held that
the Act was applicable to the state-owned institutions.
As recently as 1975, in Fry v. United States,75 the Court denied a
claim that states should not be bound by commerce clause regulation
because the tenth amendment limits Congress' power. Although noting
that the tenth amendment prohibits Congress from exercising power
that "impairs the states' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system,"' 76 the Court nevertheless upheld application of the
67. 297 U.S. at 183.
68. The Court stated: "The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the
extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution. . . . In each case the
power of the state is subordinate to the constitutional exercise of the granted federal power." Id
at 184.
69. Id at 185.
70. 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968). The Court in Wirtz stated: "The principle of United States v.
Calfornia is controlling here." Id
71. Application of the FLSA to private employees was previously upheld as a constitution-
ally valid exercise of congressional commerce clause power in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
72. 392 U.S. at 195.
73. The Court found the requisite link to interstate commerce by pointing out the interrup-
tion of the flow of goods (a total estimated at $42.2 billion during the fiscal year) which could
result if the employees in question engaged in work stoppages or strikes. Thus, labor conditions at
the schools and hospitals affected interstate commerce. Id at 194-95.
74. This Court "will not carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguish-
able in their effect on commerce from private businesses, simply because these enterprises happen
to be run by the State for the benefit of their citizens." Id at 199.
75. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
76. Id at 547 n.7.
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Economic Stabilization Act 77 to the wages of all state and local govern-
ment employees.
78
Justification for denial of a tenth amendment limitation on Con-
gress' commerce clause power centers on the idea that in joining the
Union the state surrenders any part of its sovereignty which would
block the regulation. 79 Congress, composed of the elected representa-
tives of the people of the individual states, is deemed to have legislated
the regulation to afford fairness to the state and local interests in-
volved.80 If the regulation is inappropriate, it is for the voters to deter-
mine by changing their elected representatives,8' not for the Court to
determine by imposing a constitutionally based limitation. The Court
does not judge the appropriateness of the regulation 82 as applied to the
states but looks for the link between the regulation and Congress' com-
merce clause power.83
It was thought that the Court had silenced arguments for a tenth
amendment limitation of commerce clause power. 84 However, in 1976,
with National League of Cities, the Court abruptly shifted its position
after forty years of rejecting a tenth amendment limitation and in the
process overruled Maryland v. Wirtz.
77. Title II of the Act of August 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799.
78. 421 U.S. at 548.
79. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). See also United States v. Appa-
lachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 428 (1940), in which the Court stated: "At the formation of the
Union, the states delegated to the Federal Government authority to regulate commerce among the
states. So long as the things done within the states by the United States are valid under that
power, there can be no interference with the sovereignty of the state."
80. See Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972) (the standard gives "extreme deference
to imaginable supporting facts and conceivable legislative purposes").
81. See, eg., Railway Employes' Dept., A.F.L. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956) ("If [Con-
gress] acts unwisely, the electorate can make a change"). Cf Matsumoto, National League of
Cities--From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 35 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 35, 62 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Matsumoto], where it is stated that "[bjecause the
Congress is politically responsible to the people through the electoral process, Congress and not
the Court is in the better position to ascertain whether a given federal regulation reflects the con-
temporary notion of the appropriate balance between federal and state governmental authority."
82. See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dept., A.F.L. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956), where it
is stated that "[tihe task of the judiciary ends once it appears that the legislative measure adopted
is relevant or appropriate to the constitutional power which Congress exercises. . . . The deci-
sion rests with the policy makers, not with the judiciary." See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (necessity for regulation determined by legislature).
83. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (once the legislature is
found to have a rational basis for the regulation, the Court's role is finished).
84. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The [Tenth] [Ajmendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered").
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National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities, the National Governor's Conference
and the National League of Cities joined individual cities and states8 5
to protest the 1974 amendments to the FLSA which extended the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Act to nonsupervisory
state and municipal employees. 86 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia granted the defendant Secretary of Labor's
motion to dismiss on the authority of Maryland v. Wirtz in which the
Supreme Court had upheld extension of the Act to employees of state-
owned and operated hospitals and schools.87
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the lower
court and overruled Wirtz. 88 Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion did
not question the authority of Congress to legislate the regulation 89 but
found the regulatory power was limited to the extent it intruded on
"state sovereignty." 90 The opinion called for limiting the commerce
clause power anytime it served to displace "the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions ... ."91
Thus, determining when commerce clause regulations do not ap-
ply to state and local governments depends on defining "integral opera-
tions" and "traditional governmental functions." Unfortunately
Justice Rehnquist did not make clear what constitutes "integral" or
"traditional" governmental functions. He lists those functions involved
in the case as fire protection, police protection, sanitation, public health
and parks and recreation 92 but gives no guidelines for testing a func-
tion's validity as "integral" or "traditional." "Integral" functions could
mean those activities carried on exclusively by state and local govern-
ments such as fire and police protection. However, by overruling
Wirtz, the Court included schools and hospitals in the category of inte-
85. Twenty states and four cities brought the suit, including the following: the states of Ari-
zona, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming. California sued separately but joined in the appeal to the Supreme
Court. City governments included were Lompoc, California; Cape Girardeau, Missouri; Nash-
ville, Tennessee; and Salt Lake City, Utah.
86. See notes 3 & 71 supra.
87. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
88. 426 U.S. at 854-55.
89. "It is established beyond peradventure that the Commerce Clause of Art. I of the Consti-
tution is a grant of plenary authority to Congress." Id at 840.
90. Id at 842.
91. Id at 852.
92. Id at 851.
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gral functions. Since all schools and hospitals are not solely state-oper-
ated, the Court makes clear the idea that integral functions are not
limited to those conducted solely by state and local governments.
"Traditional" functions could mean those which states have performed
since the Union was formed; however, it has been pointed out that not
all of the functions mentioned in the opinion were performed by states
at the time the Union was formed.93 Giving form to the definition of
"traditional" or "integral" or "governmental" functions is further hin-
dered by the fact that Justice Rehnquist's opinion leaves intact two
cases which deal with functions similar to those at issue in National
League of Cities.
In Fry v. United States94 the Court upheld a regulation which pro-
hibited state governments from granting wage increases higher than
those specified by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.95 Although
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the regulation involved in Fry was a
temporary restriction,96 it was no less a displacement of the state's
choice of what wages to pay employees than the minimum wage provi-
sion of the FLSA in National League of Cities. Yet the Economic Sta-
bilization Act of Fry was deemed a legitimate exercise of regulatory
authority. 9
7
Justice Rehnquist distinguished the operation of the state-owned
railroad in United States v. California98 by saying it was not an area
regarded as an integral part of governmental activity.99 There was no
reason given why the operation of the railroad was excluded from the
category of integral governmental functions. The exclusion was per-
plexing because the railroad in question was state-operated since the
1800's, and profits from the railroad were used to operate San Fran-
cisco's harbor.100 Operation of ports and harbors was traditionally con-
sidered a state function.' 0' Thus, a state activity which appeared to fit
93. See Matsumoto, supra note 81, at 73 n.205, where it is pointed out that publicly financed
education and certain public health activities did not become common until the nineteenth
century.
94. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
95. See note 77 supra.
96. 426 U.S. at 852.
97. Justice Brennan noted the inconsistency of upholding the Economic Stabilization Act
while finding the FLSA amendments displaced state choices. 426 U.S. at 872 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
98. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
99. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
100. See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 554 (1953); Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25,
29 (1930).
101. See generally Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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the integral or traditional government function category was specifi-
cally omitted.
A major claim of the plaintiffs in National League of Cities was
that the amendments to the FLSA would impose enormous fiscal bur-
dens which would affect performance of government functions.t0 2 Al-
though Justice Rehnquist noted the potential impact of increased costs
which could result from compliance with the amendments, 0 3 he
pointed out that the economic impact of the challenged regulation was
not the basis for the Court's decision.' 04 Rather, it was the fact that the
amendments would force the states to make choices which was the cen-
tral factor in the Court's decision. 05 Relying for the most part on pre-
WWII cases,1°6 the Court determined that the states had a constitu-
tional right to make such decisions unhampered by federal regula-
tion. 07 However, after making the determination that some state
activities were beyond federal regulatory power, the Court offered little
guidance for establishing what those activities might be. 0 8
In a one-paragraph concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated
that National League of Cities adopted a balancing test for determining
when to limit congressional commerce clause regulations as applied to
state and local government activities. 1 9 There was nothing in Justice
102. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827-28 (D.D.C. 1974).
103. 426 U.S. at 846.
104. "We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution
of the issue presented. ... Id at 851.
105. "Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made." Id at 855.
106. See, e.g., Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559 (1911); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
71 (1868). In his dissent, Justice Brennan strongly criticized the majority for disregarding the
post-1937 precedents of the Court. 426 U.S. at 867.
107. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
108. The opinion used various labels for activities which could be sovereign, but none of the
labels clarify the distinction; for example, "integral governmental functions," id at 855, "impor-
tant governmental activities," id at 847, "those governmental services which their [state's] citizens
require," id, "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id at 852, and
"integral parts of [states] governmental activities," id at 854 n. 18.
109. Justice Blackmun concurring:
The Court's opinion and the dissents [sic] indicate the importance and significance of
this litigation as it bears upon the relationship between the Federal Government and our
States. Although I am not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court's
opinion--some of them suggested by the dissents--I do not read the opinion so despair-
ingly as does my Brother Brennan. In my view, the result with respect to the statute
under challenge here is necessarily correct. I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it
seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in
areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably
greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be
essential.. . . With this understanding on my part of the Court's opinion, I join it.
Id at 856.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Rehnquist's opinion, however, to support the idea that the Court
adopted a balancing test.1 0 Moreover, Justice Blackmun did not iden-
tify the constitutional basis for the balancing test, nor did he identify
and evaluate the competing interests to be balanced.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion made clear that it is no
longer sufficient to establish the rational link between the questioned
regulation and the commerce clause power. Now, after finding the
link, courts must check to be sure the regulation does not interfere with
some "integral" state function. The Court established a categorical ap-
proach for deciding when state activity may ignore federal regulation
but did not establish any method for deciding what activity fits the cat-
egory. This broad standard may afford immunity to a state accused of
violating a federal regulation where no immunity is warranted.' 11
States may argue that any activity is an integral governmental function
and, once the activity is deemed to be within the integral governmental
function category, federal regulation will not be permitted.' 12
Thus, National League of Cities announced a constitutionally
based limitation on federal commerce power regulation as applied to
state and local government activities. The decision failed, however, to
provide succinct guidelines for applying the limitation.' ' 3 Although
the Supreme Court failed to define a workable standard, lower courts
have relied on National League of Cities to decide when state activities
may escape federal commerce clause regulation.
Decisions Relying on National League of Cities
Lower courts have followed divergent paths when applying the
National League of Cities' tenth amendment limitation on congres-
sional commerce clause power. Some courts have interpreted National
League of Cities strictly as a categorical standard as set out in the plu-
rality opinion of Justice Rehnquist. 1 4 The lower courts determined
110. See Matsumoto, supra note 81, at 73. ("Under Justice Rehnquist's aproach, once an ac-
tivity is deemed traditional it is immune from federal regulation under the commerce clause,
without any regard to the importance of the federal governmental interest in the regulation.")
I11. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1125.
112. As evidenced by the Court's refusal to overrule Fry v. United States, the Court appar-
ently would sanction temporary federal regulation of immune state functions where needed in a
national emergency. 426 U.S. at 852-53.
113. "Unfortunately, the decision of a sharply divided Court in National League of Cities of-
fers little to our understanding of the federal-state balance, except to remind us that state sover-
eignty is not a dormant doctrine." Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine.-
The Status of State Sovereignty Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM UPB. L.J. 301, 303
(1980).
114. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Alewine v. City
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whether the state activity at issue was a traditional or integral govern-
mental function. If it was, the federal regulation at issue did not apply.
One example of a lower court's interpretation of the categorical ap-
proach is Christensen v. Iowa.' 5 In that case, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa was faced with whether the
Equal Pay Act' "6 applied to employees of state and local government.
The Act prohibited payment of different wages to different sexes for the
same work. Since the Equal Pay Act became law as an amendment to
the FLSA in 1963 and applied to state and local governments by virtue
of the same amendments at issue in National League of Cities, it was
feared that it too would be struck down. 117 The district court, however,
concluded that the payment of discriminatory wages was never a tradi-
tional function of state and local government."18 Since the activity in
question did not fit the traditional or integral function category, the
federal regulation prevailed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also uti-
lized the categorical approach in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland.' 9
The question in Amersbach was whether or not the FLSA amendments
applied to employees of a municipally owned airport. The Sixth Cir-
cuit stated that National League of Cities did not articulate a specific
test to be applied in determining when an activity should be considered
traditional or integral. 20 The court proceeded to articulate elements
"by which a protected government function may be identified."' 2'
Having elaborated on the proper test to apply, the Amersbach court
then found that operating an airport did fit the protected category;
therefore, the FLSA amendments did not apply to the airport
employees. 122
Council of Augusta, Ga., 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Iowa 1976), afl'd, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
115. 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976), af'd, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
116. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
117. See Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments." The Effect of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 676-79 (1977) (concluding a separate
basis for upholding the Equal Pay Act is § 5 of the fourteenth amendment).
118. 417 F. Supp. at 425.
119. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
120. Id at 1037.
121. The court identified the following elements:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available
to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the
purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain; (3) government is the principal
provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide
the service or perform the activity because of a communitywide need for the service or
activity.
Id
122. Id at 1038.
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Other courts have utilized a balancing test when applying National
League of Cities.123 While dissatisfaction with the National League of
Cities decision has sometimes been voiced, 24 courts have usually
pointed out that the balancing test was expressed in Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion as an interpretation of the plurality opinion. 25
One case that attempted to balance competing federal and state
interests was Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association v. An-
drus, 26 which dealt with a challenge to the 1977 Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act.' 27 In particular, the district court
determined whether or not the "steep slope" provisions 28 of the Act
contravened the tenth amendment by interfering with the state's tradi-
tional governmental function of regulating land use.' 29 The Act pre-
scribed federal minimum standards governing surface coal mining
which the state could either implement itself or yield to a federally ad-
ministered program. 30 The district court found this constricted the
state's ability to make "essential decisions. ' 131 Relying on the eco-
nomic impact of compliance--diminished land value and mine clos-
ings13 2-- the court concluded that the federal interest of protecting the
environment did not outweigh the state interest in "forward-looking
land use planning."'133
Viriginia Surface Mining was recently reversed by the Supreme
123. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425
(W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352
(1981); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer
Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
124. Tennessee v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206 (M.D. Tenn. 1979): "JI]t is
impossible to discern what test, if any, was established for analyzing congressional exercises of
power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Therefore, this Court looks to the judicial tests em-
ployed prior to National League of Cities .... "
125. See, e.g., Colorado v. Veterans' Adm., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd on
other grounds, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
126. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'dsub norm. Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
127. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat, 448
(codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
128. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) defines a "steep slope" as "any slope
above 20 degrees or such lesser slope as may be defined by the regulatory authority after consider-
ation of soil, climate, and other characteristics of a region or State."
30 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1976 & Supp. I 1979) contains requirements governing: (a) restoration
of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its approximate original
contour, (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hy-
drologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams and embankments;
(f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) soil disposal.
129. 483 F. Supp. at 432.
130. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1254 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
131. 483 F. Supp. at 433.
132. Id at 434.
133. Id at 435.
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Court in Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Association.134 The
Court in Hodel emphasized that NationalLeague of Cities drew a sharp
distinction between congressional regulation of private business and
federal regulation directed at state activity. 35 National League of Cit-
ies was summarized in Hodel as follows:
[A] claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid
... must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a
showing that the challenged statute regulates the 'States as States.'
Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indispu-
tably 'attributes of state sovereignty.' And third, it must be apparent
that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional functions. 1
36
Since the Surface Mine Act governed only activities of private opera-
tors, the state's challenge failed because the Act did not regulate states
as "states." 1
37
Virginia Sud'ace Mining served the useful purpose of reaffirming
that congressional commerce clause power over private activity is lim-
ited only by the requirement that the means chosen must be rationally
related to the end permitted under the Constitution. 38 Unfortunately,
the decision did little to clarify when congressional power can be pre-
vented by the tenth amendment from regulating state activity. After
determining that the mining activities were those of private operators,
the Court had no reason to elaborate on how a lower court can estab-
lish when a state activity fits the traditional or integral governmental
function test. Since the Court reiterated the three requirements of Na-
tional League of Cities without mentioning a balancing test, it can be
inferred that the Court was reaffirming the categorical approach of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in National League of Cities. How-
ever, a footnote cited Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion after
warning: "Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does
not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to con-
gressional commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in
which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it
134. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
135. Id at 2364.
136. Id at 2366 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
137. Id at 2364-65.
138. Id at 2360. Justice Rehnquist stated in a concurring opinion: "in my view, the Court
misstates the test. . . . [I]t has long been established that the commerce power does not reach
activity which merely 'affects' interstate commerce. There must instead be a showing that regu-
lated activity has a substantial effect on that commerce." Id at 2391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
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justifies State submission."'' 39 The footnote alluded to a balancing test
but did not elaborate on when such a test would be appropriate or how
to identify the competing state and federal interests.
Virginia Surface Mining left undetermined what standard National
League of Cities provided for enforcing a tenth amendment limitation
on commerce clause regulation. Virginia Surface Mining was decided
after the case which is the subject of this comment and was therefore
unavailable to the Second Circuit. Since the Supreme Court viewed
the Surface Mine Act as a restriction of private operators and did not
elaborate on guidelines for applying federal regulations to state activi-
ties, the decision would not have aided the Second Circuit even if it had
been available.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road
The state-owned Long Island Rail Road is the only common rail
carrier serving Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York State. The
line transports approximately 250,000 commuters each weekday and
interchanges freight with more than a dozen interstate rail carriers han-
dling from 800 to 1000 freight cars per week. Freight revenues in 1979
accounted for $12.1 million of a total income in excess of $300 million.
The railroad is a carrier within the definition of the Railway Labor
Act.140 Its employees receive the benefits of the Railroad Retirement
Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act and the Federal Em-
ployees Liability Act.
141
The United Transportation Union is one of seven collective bar-
gaining representatives for the LIRR operating and train employees.
In December of 1979, when the railroad and the bargaining representa-
tives were on the verge of exhausting the collective bargaining proce-
dures provided by the RLA, the union filed suit in the Eastern District
of New York seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the parties in-
volved were subject to the RLA, and thus outside the sanction of New
York's Taylor Law which prohibits strikes by public employees; and (2)
injunctive relief to protect the employees' rights under the RLA, in-
cluding an injunction against prosecution in a state court action to in-
voke the Taylor Law. 42
139. Id at 2366 n.29.
140. 634 F.2d at 22.
141. Id at 23.
142. Id at 21.
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The district judge concluded that the railroad and the union were
subject to the RLA which preempted the state's authority to regulate
labor relations of the railroad's employees. The judge issued a perma-
nent injunction restraining state action based on the Taylor Law and
enjoined the union from striking, pending review by the Second
Circuit. 1
43
The Second Circuit's Reasoning
In United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road, the court
was faced with the issue of whether to uphold the lower court ruling or
to utilize the constitutional limitation suggested in National League of
Cities. The lower court had concluded that the RLA was a legitimate
expression of congressional commerce clause power which preempted
state action in the same area. '4 The Second Circuit agreed with the
lower court's finding that the LIRR was a carrier subject to the RLA
and noted that if the railroad had been privately owned and operated
the federal regulation would have prevailed. 145 However, since the
railroad was state-owned, the court reasoned that enforcing the RLA so
as to allow a strike would interfere with the state's ability to structure
employer-employee relationships in public commuter transportation. 146
Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the lower court's decision, finding
instead that the operation of a state-owned railroad was an integral
governmental function within the definition of National League of Cit-
ies which therefore prevented intrusion by federal regulation. 147
To reach its decision, the court followed a two-tier inquiry. 148
First, the court established that the operation was an integral govern-
mental function according to the categorical approach of the plurality
opinion in National League of Cities. In the second part of its inquiry,
the court utilized a balancing test as mentioned in Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in National League of Cities.
On the question of what constitutes an integral governmental
function, the court interpreted National League of Cities to mean that a
state must retain power to make choices and decisions in its role as
provider of certain public services.149 According to the court's reason-
143. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
144. Id
145. 634 F.2d at 22-23.
146. Id at 25.
147. Id at 30.
148. Id at 24-29.
149. Id at 24-25.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ing, the freedom to strike as guaranteed by the RLA could affect the
collective bargaining process with the result that the state would be
forced to pay higher wages than it might otherwise choose to pay.
Thus, upholding the federal regulation would deprive New York State
of the right to make a fundamental employment decision.' 50 If the
higher wages were not paid and the transit workers went on strike, New
York City would be economically crippled. Thus, the employment de-
cision was one that was essential to the state's separate and independ-
ent existence.
Having found that the RLA could displace an essential govern-
mental decision, the court established that the decision concerned an
activity of the integral governmental category. The court encountered
a major obstacle at that point. The Supreme Court in National League
of Cities specifically did not overrule United States v. California,'51
which had upheld application of federal safety regulations to the state-
operated California Belt Railroad. The National League of Cities opin-
ion singled out the California Belt Railroad as an example of an activ-
ity that was not an integral governmental function. 5 2 Therefore, the
Second Circuit had to distinguish United States v. California.
The court first stated that the category of essential public services
is not static but must change to meet the times.' 53 The court next ex-
plained that since the LIRR was a passenger carrier and the Califiorna
Belt Railroad was strictly a freight line, the LIRR was more directly
beneficial to the public. 5 4 The reason passenger service was more ben-
eficial was that the LIRR was the only carrier in that part of the state.
The court placed great emphasis on the negative economic impact that
would result if the LIRR shut down, and the environmental effect from
increased auto traffic in the event of a shutdown was also pointed
out.155
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court historically rejected
focusing on the importance of a public service in determining validity
of federal regulation, the court attempted to justify such focus by ex-
amining Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 156 In Lafayette the
150. Id at 25.
151. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
152. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
153. 634 F.2d at 26 (quoting Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir.
1979)).
154. "[Tlhe service is essential to the public and inures to its benefit much more directly than
did that provided by the California Belt Railroad." 634 F.2d at 26.
155. Id at 26-27.
156. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court plurality avoided an integral function test altogether in
holding that municipally run utilities are not automatically exempt
from federal antitrust laws. 57 Recognizing this, the Second Circuit
stated that Lafayette should be limited to its antitrust context. How-
ever, the court did find support in Justice Burger's concurring opinion
to Lafayette which relied on the fact that because the utility was a busi-
ness enterprise it was not an integral governmental function. 58 The
court in Long Island Rail Road elaborated on the idea. Because a busi-
ness enterprise in competition with private suppliers demonstrated that
the public was not completely dependent on the municipality for the
service, the court reasoned that the service was not an integral govern-
mental function. Therefore, because the LIRR was not in competition
with private suppliers, the LIRR was an integral governmental
function. 1
59
Having satisfied itself that operating the LIRR constituted an inte-
gral governmental function, the court proceeded to the second part of
its two-tier analysis, balancing the state and federal interest. The court
noted that National League of Cities arguably did not involve a balanc-
ing test.' 60 Nonetheless, the court justified balancing because other
courts had interpreted such an approach' 6' and also because without
Justice Blackmun's concurrence, from which the balancing test
stemmed, National League of Cities would not have been decided as it
was. 162
To apply the balancing test, the court identified the federal interest
in upholding the RLA and the state interest in applying the Taylor
Law. The court began by stating that a primary purpose of the RLA
was to avoid interruption of interstate commerce and that the Taylor
Law furthered that purpose. 63 However, the court further defined the
federal interest as a desire to ensure continued freight service, while the
157. Id at 415.
158. 634 F.2d at 28.
159. Id
160. Id at 24.
161. The court listed the following examples of lower courts that used a balancing approach:
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980),
rev'dsub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Remmick
v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.N.D. 1977); Colorado v. Veterans' Adm., 430 F. Supp.
551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977), ar7'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444
U.S. 1014 (1980); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (W.D.N.Y.
1977). It is interesting to note that the first case the court cited, Virginia Mining, was later reversed
by the Supreme Court without mention of the balancing approach. See text accompanying notes
123-37 supra.
162. 634 F.2d at 24.
163. Id at 29.
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state interest was to ensure operation of the passenger service. 64 To
weigh the two interests, the court translated them into percentages of
the LIRR's total revenue. Since the passenger service accounted for
over eighty percent of the revenue, the state interest outweighed the
federal.' 65 Thus, "the federal interest in preserving the right of LIRR
employees is not 'demonstrably greater' than New York State's interest
in preventing LIRR strikes. ,,166 The opinion concluded that "the
rationale of National League of Cities requires reversal . .. 167
ANALYSIS
Although other lower courts had mentioned both the categorical
approach of Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion and Justice Black-
mun's balancing test, the Second Circuit's two-tier analysis was novel
by virtue of its attempted specificity.168 The court tried to do what the
Supreme Court neglected to do; that is, it sought to set down a clear
interpretation of National League of Cities by utilizing the two ap-
proaches in a carefully divided two-step inquiry. The court's goal of
establishing specific guidelines was commendable; unfortunately, the
court both ignored what concrete guidelines already existed in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion and also gave unwarranted definition to vague
generalities found in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. For ex-
ample, in order to find the operation of the LIRR to be an integral
governmental function, the court relied on criteria which had been re-
jected as controlling factors by the Supreme Court in Justice Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion in National League of Cities.
Central to the Second Circuit's decision was the impact that an
LIRR strike would have on New York's state and local economy. The
court warned of the "higher wages"'169 that would have to be paid and
164. Id at 29-30.
165. Id at 30.
166. Id
167. Id at 25.
168. Courts cited by the Second Circuit as supporting the balancing test in addition to the
categorical approach were reluctant to delineate strict interpretations. In Remmick v. Barnes
County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977), the court stated that the National League of Cities con-
clusion was reached through what "appears to be a balancing of federal interest.., against the
states' interest . I..." d at 915. The Remmick court did not attempt to identify the interests in
the case at bar. In Colorado v. Veterans' Adm., 430 F. Supp. 551 (D. Colo. 1977), aft'd on other
grounds, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980), the court did not iden-
tify interests and paid lip service to a balancing test by stating: "Accepting the balancing ap-
proach that the Usery majority intimated. . . the reporting requirement. . . does not run afoul
of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity." Id at 559.
169. 634 F.2d at 25.
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the "devastating economic injury"'7 0 that would result from allowing
the right to strike. The "possible economic effect"' 71 was germane to
the court's reasoning for labeling the state's decision to prohibit public
employee strikes as a fundamental employment decision. If the rail-
road ceased operation, the court explained, there would be "a signifi-
cant impact upon the economy of the city and the State."' 172 Thus, the
court justified its decision, in large part, by relying on the impact that a
strike could have on the economy. Yet, in the National League of Cities
plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist unequivocally pointed out that the
economic impact of the challenged regulation was not the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in that case. 73 In addition, it should be
remembered that upholding the RLA would not necessarily result in a
strike. Indeed, as the court itself noted, 74 the goal of the RLA was to
guard against interruptions in rail service. Therefore, the court en-
gaged in speculation of economic devastation that might never occur.
A second theme employed by the court was the idea that the LIRR
qualified as an integral governmental function because it was not in
competition with private enterprises. Reiterating that the LIRR fur-
nished a service "supplied primarily by state and local govern-
ments," 75 the court reasoned that a public service in competition with
private enterprises is not an integral governmental function. 76 How-
ever, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court in National
League of Cities pointedly overruled Maryland v. Wrtz177 thereby in-
cluding state-operated schools and hospitals in the category of integral
governmental functions. Since schools and hospitals are not totally
state-operated, but are in competition with private institutions, it is ob-
vious the Supreme Court did not intend for the lack of competition
from private enterprise to be a controlling factor in deciding whether
an activity is an integral governmental function worthy of immunity
from federal regulation. Therefore, the Second Circuit's reliance on
the absence of competition from private carriers as evidence of an inte-
gral governmental function was unpersuasive.
In the second part of its two-tier analysis, the court incorrectly as-
170. Id
171. Id
172. Id at 26.
173. 426 U.S. at 851. The Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of economic impact as a
controlling factor in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 at
n.33 (1981).
174. 634 F.2d at 29.
175. Id at 26.
176. Id at 28.
177. 426 U.S. at 854-55.
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sessed the competing federal and state interests. The inaccurate identi-
fication of interests highlighted the problem incurred by following the
so-called balancing test of Justice Blackmun's National League of Cities
concurrence. Since Justice Blackmun's one-paragraph concurrence
gave no guidelines for identifying the federal and state interests, the
Second Circuit was at liberty to define them in any manner. In order to
identify the federal and state interests, the court examined the purpose
of both the RLA and the Taylor Law. The court stated that the two
laws had the same goal because both sought to provide "an orderly
method of dispute resolution and to ensure continuous service." 178
However, the RLA was the first national labor law enacted by Congress
to establish a balance of power between labor and management in col-
lective bargaining. 179 Thus, it is the balance of power that ensures ami-
cable settlements of disputes, not merely the orderly method of
collective bargaining established by a labor law. Since the Taylor Law
denied the right to strike, it served to tip the balance of power in man-
agement's favor; therefore, it was inaccurate for the Second Circuit to
assume the RLA and the Taylor Law had the same goal.
The court further attempted to equate the federal interest with
keeping the interstate portion of the railroad in business and the state
interest with keeping the intrastate portion operating. By looking at the
railroad's total revenue, the court reasoned that since the intrastate por-
tion accounted for over eighty percent of revenues, the state interest
outweighed the federal. o80 Such superficial reasoning overlooks the
fact that the federal interest encompasses all activity that "affects com-
merce"'181 and therefore includes the LIRR's total operation, not
merely the interstate portion. Therefore, if indeed such interests could
be translated into percentages of revenue, the federal interest would
cover one hundred percent.
Long Island Rail Road epitomizes the problems a lower court en-
counters when attempting to interpret National League of Cities. The
plurality opinion in National League of Cities provides no guidance for
defining a traditional or integral governmental function. The plurality
opinion and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion read together leave
unclear whether a categorical or a balancing test, or both, should be
used to decide when a federal regulation can be invalidated as applied
178. 634 F.2d at 29.
179. See Cox, supra note 50, at 1339.
180. 634 F.2d at 30.
181. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (racial dis-
crimination in public lodgings reasonably related to obstruction of interstate commerce).
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to state activity. Long Island Rail Road illustrates how National League
of Cities can be manipulated to suit a court's objective. 82 As the dis-
sent to National League of Cities pointed out, "[s]uch an approach...
is a thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy
judgment that our system of government reserves to Congress."'
8 3 If
the RLA has failed to keep step with the times it should be altered by
its creator, Congress, not by the judiciary.1
84
When the Supreme Court reviews Long Island Rail Road, it
should establish concrete guidelines for determining what constitutes a
traditional or integral governmental function. The Court must decide
when, if ever, definition as an integral governmental function alone will
suffice to invoke the tenth amendment limitation on federal regulation.
The Court should clarify when, if ever, a balancing of federal versus
state interests is necessary, and, if balancing is needed, the Court
should indicate how to identify the competing interests. Unless these
clarifications of NationalLeague of Cities are made, legitimate exercises
of congressional commerce clause power remain in jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Long Island Rail Road is indica-
tive of the feebleness of the National League of Cities decision. Na-
tional League of Cities provides guidelines that at best are elusive and
at worst are capable of being distended to suit a state's self-interest. In
Long Island Rail Road the court juggled the clumsy language of Na-
tional League of Cities to protect New York State from public em-
ployee strikes. The decision illustrates the ease with which Justice
Rehnquist's ambiguous National League of Cities opinion can be
manipulated. The court's reliance on Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion to derive a balancing approach not found in the National
League of Cities plurality further magnifies the lack of substance of
NationalLeague of Cities. The real danger of NationalLeague of Cities
lies in the implications derived from Long Island Rail Road. If Na-
tional League of Cities can be used to dismember a long-standing bas-
tion of national labor policy such as the RLA, what federal labor
regulation will be next to fall? As shown by Long Island Rail Road,
182. In his dissent to National League of Cities, Justice Brennan viewed the plurality decision
as "a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which [the Court] dis-
agrees." 426 U.S. at 867.
183. Id at 876.
184. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11, 120 (1942) (restraints on Congress' exercise of power
must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes).
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states can discard federal regulation by intoning the unclear integral
governmental function standard while paying lip service to the legiti-
mate federal interest behind the regulation.
PATRICIA S. HENRY
* As this volume went to press, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Long Island Rail Road, concluding that the operation of
a passenger railroad is not among those governmental functions gener-
ally immune from federal regulation under National League of Cities.
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road, 50 U.S.L.W.
4315 (U.S. March 23, 1982). In reversing the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court gave no guidelines, however, for
applying the National League of Cities' standard and thus left un-
resolved the question of whether a categorical or balancing test ought
to be applied by the lower courts.

